The CLASSICS Act is problematic.

Last month, more than 40 professors of intellectual property (Lemley, Samuelson, Tushnet, Lessig, to name a notable few) signed a letter urging Congress to reject the CLASSICS Act (pdf below).

In the most basic terms, the CLASSICS Act has the effect creating new rewards for existing copyright holders while ignoring the "promote Progress" prong of the Copyright Clause. 

Unlike traditional radio, digital streaming services pay to use recordings made after 1972. These recordings are within the purview of federal copyright law. However, federal preemption of state law does not apply to pre-1972 sound recordings. State law applies to such recordings, and will do so until 2067. As such, the question of whether online services must pay to use them has produced a great deal of litigation in several states.

Under the proposed CLASSICS Act, digital services such as Pandora and SiriusXM would have to pay for use of pre-1972 recordings in the same manner and rate as they do for post-1972 recordings. At first blush, the legislation appears to harmonize pre- and post-1972 sound recordings, and for some that means the arbitrary line drawn at February 15, 1972 vanishes.

While harmonization may be a desirable goal, the Act itself does more bad than good: 

  • Unreasonably lengthy extension: Right now, state law applies to pre-1972 recordings until 2067. However the Act has the effect of creating yet another term extension, that is, guaranteeing payment for such recordings until 2067--even though many terms of protection for musical works underlying pre-1972 sound recordings would expire long before. As the letter states, "All but most of recent pre-1972 recordings would gain more than 95 years of protection. Earlier recordings would receive far longer protection; in the most extreme case, sound recordings from 1923 would enjoy protection until 144 years after they were created, protecting works that are older than any other works protected by copyright anywhere."
     
  • The Act does not serve the purposes of copyright law: The Act simply creates new rewards for current rights-holders and does not incentivize the creation of new works, which is counter to the statutory (and constitutional) purposes of copyright law. Moreover, severing the underlying musical work from its corresponding sound recording in terms of protection demonstrates how the Act is designed to prioritize rewards over creation.
     
  • Retroactive, unnecessary protection: The Act has the effect of federalizing state rights (as well as creating new rights in many states and extending existing rights in other states well beyond what is currently provided) with respect to pre-1972 recordings, YET it also arbitrarily exempts such recordings from nearly all of the federal statutory limitations that traditionally apply to other types of work. 
     
  • The public will suffer: The burden of compliance to be shouldered by digital services will be tremendous. Any existing work that includes pre-1972 sound recordings (e.g., audio, documentaries, podcasts, etc.) could no longer be transmitted to listeners without first securing new permissions from copyright owners in each sound recording. Big players such as Spotify and Apple Music will skirt by relatively unscathed, but the odds will be stacked against non-profits and smaller digital services. Ultimately, what this means is the public will have less access to culturally valuable works.

Congress' Latest Move To Extend Copyright Protection Is Misguided (Lawrence Lessig)

"Twenty years later, the fight for term extension has begun anew. Buried in an otherwise harmless act, passed by the House and now being considered in the Senate, this new bill purports to create a new digital performance right—basically the right to control copies of recordings on any digital platform (ever hear of the internet?)—for musical recordings made before 1972. These recordings would now have a new right, protected until 2067, which, for some, means a total term of protection of 144 years. The beneficiaries of this monopoly need do nothing to get the benefit of this gift. They don’t have to make the work available. Nor do they have to register their claims in advance."

The Limits of Filtering: A Look at the Functionality & Shortcomings of Content Detection Tools

An insightful, more technically focused white paper (authored by Engine, a startup advocacy group) on why requiring OSPs to implement content filtering in order to receive DMCA safe harbor protection is largely misguided. The points made in this piece also apply in equal force to discussions on FOSTA/SESTA. 

"The Platform is the Message" by Prof. Grimmelmann

This essay by Prof. James Grimmelmann is an enjoyable read, especially if you're curious like me about the many ways in which the Tide Pod Challenge speaks more to the absurdist nature of modern communication (as opposed to, say, teenage impulsiveness), and how such expression is increasingly difficult for online platforms to moderate.

As Grimmelmann states, in pertinent part:

It’s easy to find videos of people holding up Tide Pods, sympathetically noting how tasty they look, and then giving a finger-wagging speech about not eating them because they’re dangerous. Are these sincere anti-pod-eating public service announcements? Or are they surfing the wave of interest in pod-eating by superficially claiming to denounce it? Both at once? Are these part of the detergent-eating phenomenon (forbidden), or are they critical commentary on it (acceptable)? Online culture is awash in layers of irony; there is a sense in which there is no such thing as a pure exemplar of eating a Tide Pod unironically or a critique of the practice that is not also in part an advertisement for it. All one can say is that the Tide Pod cluster of memes and practices attract attention: the controversy only adds to the attention. The difficulty of distinguishing between a practice, a parody of the practice, and a commentary on the practice is bad news for any legal doctrines that try to distinguish among them, and for any moderation guidelines or ethical principles that try to draw similar distinctions.

This short essay is easily accessible for legal and non-legal persons alike. It elegantly breaks down the hallmarks of online user behavior, doing so by framing them in terms of parody, virality, fake news, and, more generally, the memetic media complex. In the end, Grimmelmann concludes that "[o]ur media ecosystem makes everyone froth at the mouth: some from eating Tide Pods, some from talking politics. It’s not that news is broken. Platforms are broken, and that means everything is broken." To me, this makes platform law all the more fascinating. 

Why does it feel like my current reading list has a common theme?

The Unsplash Book
Crowdsourced (!)

Every single aspect of The Unsplash Book was chosen by its community—from the photos to the paper style to the cover design. With the help of nearly 8,000 people, we created the world’s first fully open, crowdsourced book featuring contributions from 100 creatives including Dann Petty, James Allworth, Lawrence Lessig, Kirby Ferguson, and more. 

Social Media Law in a Nutshell (Nutshells)
by Prof. Ryan Garcia

Social media has transformed how the world communicates. Its impact has been felt in every corner of our society including the law. Social Media Law in a Nutshell is a wide-ranging look of how the social media transformation has impacted various legal fields. From marketing to employment to torts to criminal law to copyright and beyond, virtually every legal field has been changed by social media. By looking at high level concerns and example cases, Social Media Law in a Nutshell attempts to give practitioners exposure to social media issues and concerns so they can better advise clients and approach the new social media world with their legal eyes opened to new and old risks alike.

The Internet of Us: Knowing More and Understanding Less in the Age of Big Data
by Michael P. Lynch

We used to say "seeing is believing"; now, googling is believing. With 24/7 access to nearly all of the world’s information at our fingertips, we no longer trek to the library or the encyclopedia shelf in search of answers. We just open our browsers, type in a few keywords and wait for the information to come to us. Now firmly established as a pioneering work of modern philosophy, The Internet of Us has helped revolutionize our understanding of what it means to be human in the digital age. Indeed, demonstrating that knowledge based on reason plays an essential role in society and that there is more to “knowing” than just acquiring information, leading philosopher Michael P. Lynch shows how our digital way of life makes us value some ways of processing information over others, and thus risks distorting the greatest traits of mankind. Charting a path from Plato’s cave to Google Glass, the result is a necessary guide on how to navigate the philosophical quagmire that is the "Internet of Things."

Global Brain: The Evolution of Mass Mind from the Big Bang to the 21st Century 
by Howard Bloom

While cyber-thinkers claim the Internet is bringing us toward some sort of worldwide mind, Bloom believes we’ve had one all along. Drawing on information theory, debates within evolutionary biology, and research psychology (among other disciplines), Bloom understands the development of life on Earth as a series of achievements in collective information processing.

The World Beyond Your Head
by Matthew Crawford

Crawford investigates the challenge of mastering one's own mind. We often complain about our fractured mental lives and feel beset by outside forces that destroy our focus and disrupt our peace of mind. Any defense against this, Crawford argues, requires that we reckon with the way attention sculpts the self. Crawford investigates the intense focus of ice hockey players and short-order chefs, the quasi-autistic behavior of gambling addicts, the familiar hassles of daily life, and the deep, slow craft of building pipe organs. He shows that our current crisis of attention is only superficially the result of digital technology, and becomes more comprehensible when understood as the coming to fruition of certain assumptions at the root of Western culture that are profoundly at odds with human nature. The World Beyond Your Head makes sense of an astonishing array of common experience, from the frustrations of airport security to the rise of the hipster. With implications for the way we raise our children, the design of public spaces, and democracy itself, this is a book of urgent relevance to contemporary life.

CDA § 230 baked into NAFTA?

This EFF article articulates reasons why incorporating CDA § 230 into NAFTA can ultimately be means to protect it from encroaching domestic proposals such as SESTA and FOSTA, which are currently gaining steam in Congress. (The domestic proposals warrant their own analysis and blog post.)

This negotiation comes at a time when Section 230 stands under threat in the United States, currently from the SESTA and FOSTA proposals, which could escalate into demands that platforms also assume greater responsibility for other types of content. As uncomfortable as we are with the lack of openness of trade negotiations, baking Section 230 into NAFTA may be the best opportunity we have to protect it domestically.

It will be interesting to see how this plays out, as second round NAFTA talks are slated to begin on February 25th.

Fair Use on the Internet

Final edits pending, but here my research paper is that is slated for publishing in the Journal of Law and Technology Texas' next issue! In it, I offer recommendations for reforming fair use to meet the communication needs of today's information society. 

A California Court Says Tinder's Pricing Policy Discriminates Based on Age

A California appeals court has sided with Allan Candelore, a man suing Tinder over the pricing for its premium service, Tinder Plus. Specifically, Candelore and his lawyers argued that by charging $9.99 per month if a user is under 30, versus $19.99 per month if you’re 30 or older, Tinder is discriminating based on age, in violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act and the Unfair Competition Law (those are both California laws). Read more on TechCrunch

A New Theory of Fair Use, Re-conceptualized and Updated for Today's Information Society

I haven't written in quite a while, though for good reason. (Praise be to Lord BarBri!) 

I recently wrote a piece on why and how the fair use doctrine, as it is currently applied to emerging forms of creative expression, should be realigned with today's digital realities: A New Theory of Fair Use, Re-conceptualized and Updated for Today's Information Society (pdf). 

The following is an excerpt of the Introduction (with minor changes made in formatting): 

Copyright law and the First Amendment right to free speech are oftentimes at conceptual odds with each other. As legal scholar Paul Goldstein puts it, “[C]opyright persists in its potential for conflict with the first amendment.”[1] The former--a government creation--effectuates the idea that ownership of a work is exclusively conferred onto the creator so as to protect her work from unauthorized use by others[2], whereas the latter curtails government restrictions on people’s constitutionally guaranteed right to free speech and expression.[3]

Even so, copyright and free speech are not meant to exist in absolute disharmony. Crucially, the U.S. Constitution contains clauses on both copyright and free speech, implying that the Framers intended for copyright to not exist without limit. The Constitution’s inclusion of both clauses also lends credence to the notion that, within a certain range of conditions, copyright[4] and the First Amendment actually further the same democratic goal: safeguarding the free and widespread dissemination of expression and ideas. In search of that point of optimality, several mechanisms have been developed in copyright law that function to balance the preservation of free-speech values with the enforcement of creators’ copyright interest in their works. This essay focuses on the fair use doctrine specifically and the extent to which it is effective in harmonizing freedom of expression and copyright.

The way courts apply fair use today is increasingly outmoded. As digital technologies have fundamentally changed the way people speak and interact, the fulcrum between freedom of expression and its counterweight, copyright enforcement, has likewise shifted. Today’s World Wide Web has made possible the seamless distribution, circulation and exchange of expressive works from person to person, and in turn, the creation of many novel, modern-day channels of expression. In particular, the popularity of collage and appropriation art forms such as mashups and internet “memes” has risen to viral proportions.[5] However, many such collage and appropriation works do not fall within traditional notions of fair use and, as a result, undergo crude judicial analysis. The resulting uncertainty over the reliability of fair use as a balancing tool, then, tends to chill the dissemination of certain types of expression, even though many of them are considered by society as staples of cultural communication in the digital era. Put differently: The overall effect of a shaky fair use standard is that the shared goal of copyright and the First Amendment strays further away from actualization.

Therefore, the current state of jurisprudential treatment of fair use as a balancing mechanism warrants serious reexamination. Rather than adhere to arcane distinctions, fair use should mirror the public normative perception of where the line between speech and copyright exists. As such, this essay proposes and supports the following recommendation for reform: Embracing an expansive, Cariou-like conception of fair use that subsumes online-era transformative appropriation/adaptive uses of existing works--in combination with shifting the burden of proof from the fair user to the copyright holder--will reinstate fair use as an effective balancing mechanism between free speech and copyright values. Doing so will realign the fair use standard not only with today’s technological realities but also critical democratic theories of expression. 

[1] Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. Rev. 983, 984 (1970).
[2] U.S. CONST. amend. I.
[3] Copyright law and enforcement draw their persuasive thrust from Article I, § 8, cl. 8 of the United States Constitution. It states, in pertinent part, that Congress is empowered to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
[4] In other words: the Copyright Clause, which is implemented by the Copyright Act of 1976.
[5] See Kim Zetter, “Humans Are Just Machines For Propagating Memes”, Wired (February 29, 2008) (“A meme can be a song or snippet of a song, a dance, an urban legend, an expression or behavior, a product brand or even a religion.”).

Enjoy!

The Ultimate Privacy Loophole: The Third-Party Doctrine applied to the "Internet of Things"

Today’s tech-ubiquity has led to a growing tension between freedom of speech and privacy law. In years to come, civil society organization as well as privacy and free speech advocates will have to be vigilant in fighting against outmoded aspects of privacy law; otherwise, government surveillance through technology will cast a widespread chilling effect over the exercise of First Amendment rights.

Since its inception, the Fourth Amendment has been based on the idea that the prime danger to private sovereignty is that the “sanctity of [our] home[s] will be breached by government actors.”[1] To the American mind, what has traditionally mattered is sovereignty within one’s home--the right to privacy, at its metamorphic core, is a right to hide behind the walls of one’s home.[2] Yet smart phones, big data, "Internet of Things" devices--the modern-day staples for communication--can now compose a rich, granular mosaic of any given user’s life patterns inside the home.[3] This, of course, has garnered a great deal of attention from law enforcement, whose actors are limited by the warrant framework in place. Indeed, there has been an uptick in expansive warrants, seemingly unconnected to the U.S. national security apparatus.[4] Google was ordered by a district court to turn over the personal information of all users who Google-searched an Edna, MN, resident.[5] Likewise, Arkansas police obtained a warrant to search a murder suspect’s Amazon Echo. Amazon has contested the warrant, claiming that Echo’s recordings and responses are forms of free expression, therefore deserving of heightened protection under the First Amendment.[6] In Amazon’s view, First Amendment protection necessarily includes “the right to browse and purchase expressive materials anonymously, without fear of government discovery.”[7]

In addition to overreaching warrants, the third-party doctrine--a product of analog-era jurisprudence--dramatically erodes privacy protections. Under the doctrine, those who voluntarily share information with third parties are understood to have no cognizable expectation of privacy as to that information.[8] Here is where the contradiction deepens: data collected within the home is streamed to the servers of a third-party corporation. There is nothing stopping Google from voluntarily sharing, sans warrant, users’ Nest home data with law enforcement.

These lesions in privacy law enable unbridled government surveillance into the home, the citadel of Fourth-Amendment privacy.[9] And, It is well documented that fear of government access to user information discourages people from full engagement online, compromising freedom of expression in the most private of spaces.[10] Therefore, in the midst of seamless data collection by "smart" devices, principles of privacy law must be realigned with today’s technological realities.

EDIT: I'd be remiss if I didn't at least mention legal scholar Orin Kerr's defense of the third-party doctrine: The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, one of the few well-thought out defenses of the doctrine.[11] He contends that mainstream criticism of the third-party doctrine overlooks two important benefits of the rule--those being: 1) the rule ensures technological neutrality in Fourth Amendment rules and inhibits the substitution effect (wrongdoers are less able to take public aspects of their crimes and replace them with third-party private transactions, effectively hiding their criminal enterprises from observation); 2) the rule fosters ex ante clarity by matching the Fourth Amendment rules for information with the Fourth Amendment rules for location. I suppose whether or not the doctrine should have a place in today's legal world depends on where society will decide to draw the line between public and private spaces.

---
[1] Boyd v. United States, 16. U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (observing that the Fourth Amendment is based on the idea that the prime danger to private sovereignty is that the “sanctity of [our] home[s] will be breached by government actors.”).
[2] Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment draws ‘a firm line at the entrance to the house.”); see also James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures on Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 Yale L.J. 1151 (2004).
[3] See Robert Scobel & Shel Israel, Age of Context: Mobile, Sensors, Data and the Future of Privacy (2006).
[4] See The Law Is My Ass E08, February 4, 2017 with Jamie Lee Williams of the EFF, The Law Is My Ass (Feb. 4, 2017). 
[5] Ashlee Kieler, “Search Warrant Issued For Everyone Who Googled Identity Theft Victim’s Name”, Consumerist (March 17, 2017).
[6] Thomas Fox-Brewster, “Amazon Argues Alexa Speech Protected By First Amendment In Murder Trial Fight”, Forbes (Feb 23, 2017).
[7] Memorandum of Law in support of Amazon’s Motion to Quash Search Warrant at 2, State v. Bates, No. 04CR-16-370 (Ark. Cir. Ct. 2017).
[8] Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
[9] See U.S. v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[I]t may may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.”).
[10] See Jon Penney, Chilling Effects: Online Surveillance and Wikipedia Use, 31 Berkeley Tech. L. J. 117 (2016); see also Amazon.com LLC v. Lay, 75 F.Supp.2d 1154, 1168 (W.D. Wash. 2010) (“The fear of government tracking and censoring one’s reading, listening, and viewing choices chills the exercise of First Amendment rights.”); Jeff Guo, “New study: Snowden’s disclosures about NSA spying had a scary effect on free speech”, The Washington Post (April 27, 2016).
[11] Orin Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 561 (2009).  

A warrant, unwarranted.

A district court judge in Minnesota recently granted a warrant requiring Google to turn over the personal information of all users who Google-searched the name (or variations thereof) of an Edna, MN, resident. This person was allegedly victim to an attempted ID and credit theft. 

The warrant, however, is breathtaking in scope: It demands Google to help police determine who searched for the victim's name between December 1 of last year through January 7, 2017 (approx. 5 weeks). To elaborate, 

  • the application for the search warrant asks for "[a]ny/all user or subscriber information related to the Google search[] [in question] . . . [f]or the timeframe of December 1st, 2016 thru January 7th, 2017" including "the specific date/time the searches took place";
  • the requested information can also include, but is not limited to: "name(s), address(es), telephone number(s), dates of birth, social security numbers, email addresses, payment information, account Information, IP [internet protocol] addresses, and MAC [media access control] addresses of the person(s) who requested/completed the search." 

Translated into simpler terms, this means I could one day find myself vulnerable to police investigation simply by virtue of Googling, on a whim, Samantha from third grade. 

Investigators are targeting Google because an online photo of the victim turned up on the fake passport that was used to trick a credit union into fraudulently transferring money out of the victim's account. The warrant application states that a Google search revealed the same photo that was used on the fake passport. Regardless of the possible merits of investigators' assertions, search warrants must be based on probable cause, not just mere conjecture.

Many privacy advocates are concerned, and rightfully so:

  • “This kind of warrant is cause for concern because it’s closer to these dragnet searches that the Fourth Amendment is designed to prevent,” law professor William McGeveran tells StarTribune
  • A spokesperson for Google states: "We will continue to object to this overreaching request for user data, and if needed, will fight it in court. We always push back when we receive excessively broad requests for data about our users.” 
  • ArsTechnica calls the warrant "perhaps the most expansive one we've seen unconnected to the U.S. national security apparatus." 
  • “I’m rather skeptical of this warrant’s ability to survive constitutional scrutiny,” says Stephanie Lacambra, an attorney for the Electronic Frontier Foundation.

Indeed, the externalities flowing from this warrant--i.e, the severe intrusion into a large swathe of peoples' private lives--is highly disproportionate to the state's interest in solving this sub-$30,000 crime. From a cost-benefit standpoint, the scope of the warrant is, well, unwarranted. 

If unchallenged, this warrant could open the door for similar warrants and, in turn, produce a widespread chilling effect on online free speech. Consider the following: If personal Google searches are generally known to be vulnerable to investigative probing, then it is likely that people will exercise ex-ante restraint when making such searches online. In the aggregate, this will only decelerate the dissemination of knowledge and ideas, compromising the spirit of the open web. To skeptical readers who have made it this far: Such an outcome is not outside the realm of possibility. A study by Jonathon W. Penny, published in the Berkeley Technology Law Journal, suggests that traffic to Wikipedia articles on topics that raise privacy concerns for Wikipedia users significantly declined after widespread publicity of Snowden's revelations about NSA/PRISM surveillance. This warrant, then, is improperly exacting--a step towards an Orwellian future in which using a search engine can suddenly transform a person into the object of a search warrant.

Online searching without restraint is a prerequisite to a free and open internet--it enables collaboration and access to knowledge for all. This warrant, if successful, will signal a troubling acceptance of thought policing, which patently contradicts our First-Amendment right to freedom of speech and expression.

In a similar vein, we must also consider the scenario in which Google elects to comply with investigators right from the outset. At present, there is nothing in the law that could stop Google from voluntarily sharing much of the requested information with law enforcement. Under the third-party doctrine--a rather ugly blemish on Fourth-Amendment jurisprudence--those who voluntarily share information with third parties (including corporations like Google) are thought to have no cognizable expectation of privacy as to that information.* 

Clearly, then, there is much to be desired when it comes to American privacy law.

*For a deep-dive into the consumer privacy implications of the "Internet of Things," click here.

How will the law evolve in the context of VR/AR? Check out this new piece by legal heavy-hitters Mark A. Lemley and Eugene Volokh: "Law, Virtual Reality, and Augmented Reality." 

Abstract

Virtual Reality (VR) and Augmented Reality (AR) are going to be big -- not just for gaming but for work, for social life, and for evaluating and buying real-world products. Like many big technological advances, they will in some ways challenge legal doctrine. In this Article, we will speculate about some of these upcoming challenges, asking:

(1) How might the law treat “street crimes” in VR and AR -- behavior such as disturbing the peace, indecent exposure, deliberately harmful visuals (such as strobe lighting used to provoke seizures in people with epilepsy), and “virtual groping”? Two key aspects of this, we will argue, are the Bangladesh problem (which will make criminal law very hard to practically enforce) and technologically enabled self-help (which will offer an attractive alternative protection to users, but also a further excuse for real-world police departments not to get involved).

(2) How might the law handle tort lawsuits, by users against users, users against VR and AR environment operators, outsiders (such as copyright owners whose works are being copied by users) against users, and outsiders against the environment operators?

(3) How might the law treat users’ alteration of other users’ avatars, or creation of their own avatars that borrow someone else’s name and likeness?

(4) How might privacy law deal with the likely pervasive storage of all the sensory information that VR and AR systems present to their users, and that they gather from the users in the course of presenting it?

(5) How might these analyses reflect on broader debates even outside VR and AR, especially order without law and the speech-conduct distinction?

Universal Connectivity & Net Neutrality: Is A Union Between The Two Possible?

Below is a policy piece on Facebook's failed Free Basics initiative that I co-authored with a fellow classmate in Tech Policy Lab. For a fuller version of the essay--i.e., including citations and explanatory footnotes--please click here.

I. Internet Access as a Human Right

Technology and the ability to access and share information have become integral in today’s world. With a simple cell phone and Google search, an individual can search any query that arises throughout the day and instantaneously find the answer. What is the circumference of the Earth? 24,901 miles. What day did man land on the moon? July 20, 1969. Inquiries that once required an encyclopedia, almanac, or newspaper can now be found anytime and anywhere thanks to the Internet. In addition to the access of information, the Internet provides a means to share one’s own thoughts or work. People catalog and disseminate their interests, political opinions, and beliefs on social media platforms and blogs.

The Internet acts as a vital communication tool with unparalleled access to current news, historical facts, and a connection to the entire world. However, Internet access is concentrated in wealthy, developed countries as shown in Figure 1 below, while poorest countries such as Pakistan, Uganda, and Ethiopia face the lowest access rates. Unlike any other previous technology, the Internet enables other rights such as free speech and increases levels of democratic attainment. Some argue, however, that the role of Internet should be limited to the enablement of other rights. Yet given that the Internet is such an important part of current society, the question arises whether access to the Internet should be viewed a human right on its own.

Figure 1

Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights sets the framework for this discussion by establishing the right to, “hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through any media regardless of frontiers.” This Article has typically been interpreted as the freedom of expression in conjunction with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. With the established right to communicate effectively, it then becomes a concern of whether everyone should have the available tools to do so. Citizens in countries without access to the Internet have their communication stifled without the ability to access or share opinions or work on the same magnitude as individuals in wealthier nations. Furthermore, as online sources become a dominant form of news, people without Internet access are at a serious disadvantage.

In July 2016, the U.N. established Internet access as a human right through a resolution declaring the importance of “applying a comprehensive human-rights based approach when providing and expanding access to the Internet and for the Internet to be open, accessible, and nurtured.” The resolution calls upon countries to provide citizens with access to the Internet and condemns any attempt to block access. Unfortunately for those without Internet, the resolution is not legally enforceable and can only increase awareness to the issue. Many countries may still push back against this resolution because it requires them to construct infrastructure for information systems. Therefore, the outlook for citizens in countries without access still remains unclear.

In an effort to push this issue forward, the private sector has attempted to fill the Internet access gap. Facebook’s CEO, Mark Zuckerberg, has weighed in on this issue. In a post, he stated, “The internet is one of the most powerful tools for economic and social progress. It gives people access to jobs, knowledge and opportunities. It gives voice to the voiceless in our society, and it connects people with vital resources for health and education.” The company has taken an approach towards this problem by providing a free Internet service called Free Basics.

II.        Facebook’s Free Basics as a means towards achieving this ideal?

Free Basics--a program launched via Facebook’s Internet.org in 2015--is an initiative propelled by the social media giant that “aims to connect 2/3 of the world that is not yet connected to the internet.” Specifically, Free Basics is a service that allows people to access certain Internet Services for free on mobile, that is, without incurring data usage charges. In other words, it is a zero-ratings program.

A. The Stakeholder Perspective: Facebook’s Stance and India’s Response

When Mark Zuckerberg introduced Free Basics to India as a way to provide web access to the developing world, many Indians--citizens and companies alike--vehemently opposed the initiative. Many Indian internet activists viewed it more as an aggressive, public-relations ploy than anything else. In their minds: Although purporting to be a free internet service for the poor, Free Basics in reality constituted a watered-down version of Facebook with some other services tacked on as an afterthought (e.g., weather reports and job listings.) “I felt betrayed--not only betrayed but upset and angry,” Osama Manzar, director of India’s Digital Empowerment Foundation, said. “[Zuckerberg] said we’re going to solve the problem with access and bandwidth. But Facebook is not the Internet.”

From Zuckerberg’s perspective, launching his sweeping Internet.org initiative was a way to provide 4 billion people in the developing world with Internet access, which he views as a basic human right. In the midst of a relatively aggressive campaign (i.e., billboard ads, mass text messages, newspaper ads, etc.) that called for popular support for the program, Zuckerberg wrote several op-eds in some of India’s most prominent news publications. For instance, in the Times of India, Zuckerberg made the case that Free Basics actually protects net neutrality. In his own words:

Instead of wanting to give people access to some basic internet services for free, critics of the program continue to spread false claims – even if that means leaving behind a billion people. Instead of recognizing the fact that Free Basics is opening up the whole internet, they continue to claim – falsely – that this will make the internet more like a walled garden. Instead of welcoming Free Basics as an open platform that will partner with any telco, and allows any developer to offer services to people for free, they claim – falsely – that this will give people less choice. Instead of recognizing that Free Basics fully respects net neutrality, they claim – falsely – the exact opposite.

Nikhil Pahwa, a leading Internet activist in India and co-founder of SaveTheInternet, wrote a counter-response, posing the following key question: “Why has Facebook chosen the current model for Free Basics, which gives users a selection of around a hundred sites . . . while rejecting the option of giving the poor free access to the open, plural and diverse web?” Indeed, this seemed to be the operating concern for many internet activists at the time, that Facebook through Free Basics was attempting to corner out the ad market and take control of services and information in third-world countries. After all, India has 130 million Facebook users, second only to the United States--the market potential is therefore objectively hard to deny.

“All access is priority,” asserted Pahwa in his response. “Why hasn’t Facebook chosen the options that do not violate Net Neutrality?” It is important to note that Facebook, in the course of its partnership with Indian telecom giant Reliance Communications, would still remain the arbiter of what websites and apps would be included in Free Basics. These two opposing perspectives espoused by Zuckerberg and Pahwa--though concurrently claiming to support Net Neutrality principles--illustrate the fact that the Free Basics problem was there to stay no matter which way one sliced it.

Though, perhaps there is a middle ground. “The thing people forget about Free Basics is that it’s intended to be a temporary transition for people to give them a taste of the Internet and sign up. It’s a marketing program for the carrier in some sense,” said David Kirkpatrick, author of “The Facebook Effect.” But he added, “The idea that it’s some kind of alternative Internet that’s a discriminatory gesture to the poor is is the prevailing view among the Indian intelligentsia. It’s fundamentally misunderstood.” Indeed, Facebook acknowledged that it considered billing Free Basics as a loss-leader. As the company explained during its advocacy to the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (“TRAI”):

Most [Free Basics users] upgrade to paid access [and] the majority of Free Basics users pay to access Internet content outside of Free Basics in their first month of use, and the number keeps rising over time. These arrangements therefore act as an on-ramp to the Internet.  It is this on-ramp that Facebook has an interest in seeing flourish.

This lends some credence to the idea that Facebook partnering with ISPs to provide Free Basics would result in preferential and selective access to a set of app developers and services, which would ultimately undermine the main thrust of Net Neutrality. The following questions naturally arise: Should Internet access--largely viewed as access to a public utility--serve as a vessel for a private company’s marketing program? Or, should regulators allow for minor marketing efforts to be swept under the rug in the short-term if the transition via Free Basics yields a net positive in the long run (i.e., the majority of Free Basics users ultimately migrating to unlimited, but not free, usage options)?

In the midst of such a heady atmosphere, TRAI took little time to weigh in on the controversy. Implicitly skeptical of Facebook’s on-ramp argument, TRAI ruled against discriminatory access to data services on February 8th, 2016, and put its full regulatory weight behind protecting broad Net Neutrality principles--effectively wiping out Facebook’s Free Basics program in one of the world’s largest Internet markets.

B. TRAI’s Grounds for Making its Decision

When it ruled against discriminatory access to data services, TRAI did not expressly allude to Free Basics. However, it is widely speculated that the public outcry resulting from the Free Basics debate served as a major impetus to enact such rules. In its decision, TRAI said it had “received a large number of responses” to a consultation  paper on differential pricing that was released the previous December. Notably, the regulator then added that the “[m]ajority of individual comments received did not address specific questions that were raised in the consultation paper.” Therefore, the 11 million-odd template responses Facebook claimed its users had sent to TRAI did not count for much. As one lawyer wonders: “to what extent [was] TRAI’s Decision . . . driven by politics--and perhaps [by] unfavorable optics that Facebook was unable to sufficiently rebut--rather than objective legal reasoning. Skepticism about the altruistic motive behind Free Basics is reflected in the press coverage of the Decision, as are undertones of perceived imperialistic hubris.”

That being said, TRAI bypassed mentioning such sociopolitical arguments and instead asserted that the main object of its concerns was the protection of Net Neutrality principles in India. In TRAI’s view, allowing one to charge differentially for data could potentially damage the entire “architecture of the internet.” TRAI was mainly concerned with maintaining a level playing field and fair competition--especially since Airtel is India’s largest telecom company and among the world’s largest, and Reliance Communications (Facebook’s Free Basics partner in India) planned on partnering with Reliance Jio, India’s upcoming 4G telecom service that cost about $14 billion to set up. In the words of the TRAI:

It is argued that this will create an uneven playing field among content providers and service providers—large, well-established content providers and service providers or those that have the benefit of large networks will find themselves in a much stronger bargaining position as compared to new or smaller businesses. This may create significant entry barriers and thus harm competition and innovation. This poses an even greater concern in cases where there might be a conflict of interest in the service provider’s role as a service provider as well as a participant in a vertical market where it acts in competition with other content providers. New and smaller service providers will face crucial challenges in view of the significant market power enjoyed by bigger service providers and content providers.

TRAI also expressed concern over the notion that zero-rating pricing models would segment the market for Internet usage, which would ultimately hurt the positive network effect benefits that arise from the universal connectedness of the traditional internet. Another important, though arguably paternalistic concern centered on “information asymmetry”--that Free Basic partners would take advantage of new users, many of whom have not used the Internet and do not know enough about it to make informed decisions online. “[I]nternet access is not a ‘search good’ but rather an ‘experience good’ which can be understood properly only after being used. Thus . . . many consumers may not be in a position to understand the information being presented to them,” reasoned TRAI when justifying its decision.

There is certainly an argument for supporting the idea that TRAI’s decision to mandate expansive Net Neutrality principles was based on the fact that Facebook, through Free Basics, would assert control and favor some content over others based on something other than purely technical/bandwidth related-concerns. In any case, when viewed in terms of achieving universal Web access, the Free Basics program was a failed attempt as far as India was concerned. What, then, is the most effective means towards achieving the positive human right to universal access to the Open Web?  

III.      Universal Internet Access via Zero-Ratings Pricing

A. Benefits of Internet Access

Facebook initially offered Free Basics as a way to finally connect the entire world and provide Internet service to the remaining pockets still without access. Mark Zuckerberg views the program as an agent for change by giving citizens a voice. Over the past decade, Facebook has been largely influential to political development around the world. Whether a user is a politician, celebrity, or critic, everyone can make his or her opinion known to the world. Consequently, this tool creates an informed and engaged public. The platform fosters the dissemination of articles and posts by allowing users to share a copy to a friend, family member, or followers. As a result, every news article, video, or blog post can become a center for public discussion. This discourse could also help to bridge the cultural gap as people from all over the globe can share their experiences and knowledge.

Other than social benefits, Internet access has been shown to provide economic advantages for developing countries. Joshua Meltzer, at the Brookings Institute, explained how the Internet can be a platform for international trade because it provides an opportunity for small to medium businesses in developing countries to participate. Robert Atkinson, from Information Technology and Innovation, substantiated this argument by pointing to research that shows “Internet penetration is positively correlated, positively causally related to exports.” Developing countries are especially affected by Internet access because small businesses typically have trouble “identifying customers, acquiring information in foreign markets, [and] setting up relationships with distributors." Therefore, Free Basics could arguably resolve these issues by providing a an established platform with a connection to the rest of the globe. In a blog post on the Times of India, Mark Zuckerberg described the platform that offers “education, healthcare, jobs and communication that people can use without paying for data.” Furthermore, he claimed it will provide citizens with economic and social opportunities. Despite Zuckerberg’s claims, there are some serious criticisms of the platform.

B. Detriments of Internet Access

The primary criticism for Free Basics revolves around Facebook’s central role in the platform. The Electronic Frontier Foundation pointed out that there is no, “technical restriction that prevents the company from monitoring and recording the traffic of Free Basics users.” Consequently, there is no guarantee for Free Basics’ users privacy. In addition, the problem of censorship arises. Facebook can curate the user’s Internet experience by selecting specific sites, articles, and advertisements. The pressure to censor or promote certain material may even be government mandated. In effect, user’s access to information would be limited, which curtails the benefit of having an informed and engaged public. Thus, critics claim the platform as not truly “free” since it comes at the cost of the user’s privacy and censorship.

IV.      Moving Forward

Given the above, one fact is resoundingly clear: Universal access to the Internet is a vital goal that warrants global attention. Regulators all over the world, tasked with having to grapple with this difficult issue, should strive for a happy medium. Therefore, the best solution is not necessarily a blanket ban on selective access to data services, nor is it a total disregard for Net Neutrality principles. Although flawed in his methodology, Zuckerberg was perhaps right on at least one point: “[N]et neutrality and universal connectivity[] can and must coexist.”

When construed against other regions of the world and their net neutrality policies, the E.U. appears to be the most balanced and the closest towards fostering a viable coexistence between network neutrality and universal connectivity. Therefore, should a similar situation ever arise in the future (and it is hard to imagine it will not), maybe it would behoove telecom regulators to tear a page out of the European Union’s book. In November 2015, the E.U. enacted its new Net Neutrality Regulation. In the summer of 2016, the E.U. further fleshed out the statutory language of the Regulation in its Guidelines (drafted by BEREC, an important E.U. regulatory body).

In the E.U., zero-ratings projects are assessed on a case-by-case basis, but done in such a way that Net Neutrality principles are continually safeguarded. To elaborate, Paragraph 43-46 of the Guidelines indicates that, instead of a wholesale ban on zero-rating, a “case-by-case” approach is to be implemented. In doing so, the matter is left to the telecom regulators to assess each zero-rating deal individually and “frown on anything that steers people away from competitive services.” The Guidelines specifically stipulate that telecom regulators are to assess whether the zero-rating deal is underpinned by commercial interests and whether the commercial practices that stem from the zero-rating deal in question would “limit the exercise of the end-users’ rights granted under Article 3(1)” of the Regulation. If so, the deal is denied.

The beauty in this regulatory arrangement is that benign zero-ratings projects such as Wikipedia Zero, which are arguably not as fueled by commercial interests, are still able to work towards achieving the union of network neutrality and universal connectivity. Applied to Free Basics in India, a case-by-case approach would allow TRIA to at least apply heightened scrutiny when assessing Free Basics and other similar projects, all of which could very well be guised as tools for free Internet access, but in reality run afoul with net neutrality rules.

To put it simply, there is a dire need for regulators to come up with a scheme that encourages genuine universal access of the Open Web while protecting against projects that espouse commercial undertones and reek of digital colonialism. After all, at the end of the day, Facebook is first and foremost a profit-seeking company--not a traditional ISP, government agency, or nonprofit. That fact alone should invite heightened scrutiny, but perhaps not lead to an automatic denial at the front door.

For further reading: 
- "Facebook's Free Basics: More Open, Better Security, but Still a Walled Garden" (Electronic Frontier Foundation)
- "Free Basics protects net neutrality" (Mark Zuckerberg in the Times of India)
- "It's a battle for Internet Freedom" (A response to Zuckerberg by Nikhil Pahwa, a prominent Net Neutrality Activist in India; Times of India)
- "What Facebook won't tell you about Free Basics" (SaveTheInternet)
- "Lessons from Facebook's Fumble in India" (Harvard Business Review)
- "Was India right in banning Facebook's Free basics?" (Quartz, originally published by the Center for Democracy & Technology)
- "Facebook gears up for Express Wifi launch in India" (Mashable)

What an inspiring listen. As a victim of online harassment and violation of sexual privacy herself, lawyer Carrie Goldberg has made it her mission to combat the advent of "revenge porn" or non-consensual photography that often gets posted online by disgruntled ex-lovers. Perhaps surprising to some, her clients range from young teenage girls to high-powered executives and VCs. Intuitively, harmful conduct exacted upon another person online seems markedly different from when those harms occur in the real, "physical" world. Perhaps this is due to the Internet's exceptionalism as construed against the real world: that is, its unique ability to magnify and scale up exposure of harmful content as well as dramatically elongate the shelf life of that content by making it easily searchable. 

Below are parts of the interview I found particularly compelling:

  • Question @3:24: Despite these very real threats to your security, you say the thing that felt most out of control was what might happen online, not in the real world as it were. 
    Goldberg's Answer: Right. And I think that has to do with the fact that there is legislation, there are laws that are supposed to protect us physically. You know there are laws against assault and stalking and harassment, but there were no laws that protected some of the threats and the online stuff. And also [the reason] the online conduct felt so uncontrollable is that the Internet is so big and uncontrollable and abstract and unwieldy--I mean, how do you control the Internet? 
     
  • Question @4:43: How did that situation end? 
    Goldberg's Answer: . . . [I]t was at that day in family court when my life path had made this big pivot because that was when the judge told me that, even though he could restrain my attacker's physical conduct towards me and he could issue this order that says he can't contact me, he can't assault me, the judge said, "but I cannot restrain him from his First Amendment right, his right to free speech . . . You've got a constitutional problem here." . . . "A constitutional problem? What are you talking about?" This judge claimed that this was a free speech issue, and the offender had the free speech right to express himself through my naked pictures. And from that moment on I was like, I need to research this. There's just this no-brainer assumption that, that no it's not legal to send naked pictures of other people. We all know it's not legal to share medical information, and there are criminal laws against sharing commercial information and trade secrets and other types of very private information. And so it was shocking to me to learn at that moment that there were no similar restrictions when it came to sexual privacy. 
     
  • Question @6:28: So when the judge said to you, "You need to get a lawyer." You thought, well, I'll be that lawyer. 
    Goldberg's Answer: Yes. Eventually, I did became that lawyer. I wasn't prepared at that moment to be that lawyer. I sort of assumed that I'd be able to find a lawyer who did have that expertise, you know who did understand that intersection between privacy law and Internet law and domestic violence and criminal law, and I could not find that lawyer, that lawyer did not exist. And so I became that lawyer! 

Her last point strongly resonates with how I feel about the legal lag behind tech: Threats to civil liberties on online platforms have not yet been addressed by law or regulation to the extent necessary, and people are greatly suffering for it. 

Prosecutors Score a Goal in FIFA 17 Gambling Case

Check out a blog post I co-authored for video-game law firm Morrison / Lee. 

The U.K. has fully prosecuted its first video game based gambling incident. Craig “NepentheZ” Douglas and Dylan Rigby operate the website FutGalaxy which enabled its users to bet virtual currency from FIFA 17 on real-life football matches. Last September, Douglas and Rigby were charged with promoting lottery and advertising unlawful gambling under the U.K.’s Gambling Act, with Douglas receiving an extra charge of inviting minors to gamble.

Read the article: Morrison / Lee

A Roundtable on Fake News and Social Media

Earlier this week, the Journal of Law and Technology at Texas hosted a roundtable to discuss the advent and consequences of fake news on social media. The panelists included:

  • Ross Ramsey, Co-Founder and Executive Editor of the Texas Tribune. A traditional media perspective on the issues relating to fake news.
  • Warren Hanes, known as the "Godfather of Intellectual Property" at Facebook from 2007 to 2013. An insider with the social media giant most caught up in the fake news phenomenon.
  • Ryan Garcia, Managing Legal Director (Social Media, Retail, Gaming, Consumer Contract Management) at Dell and "Law & Social Media" Professor at the University of Texas School of Law. An expert in social media law with the legal academic perspective on the issue. 

That same day, I had read about Wikipedia editors banning Daily Mail as an unreliable source for its website. I wanted to hear their thoughts on the idea of websites placing a blanket, sourced-based ban on a news site as opposed to a content-based ban. You can listen to my question for the panel at 33:18. Overall, I found the discussion to be quite illuminating. 

U.S. Supreme Court will not examine tech industry legal shield

The U.S. Supreme Court on Monday boosted one of the tech industry's go-to defenses in suits to hold websites liable for content posted by others, rebuffing an appeal by women who accused an online ad site of promoting child sex trafficking.

The justices refused to consider reviving a lawsuit against Backpage.com filed by three young women who claimed the website facilitated their forced prostitution through classified advertisements posted in its "escorts" section.

The high court let stand a lower court's decision last year to dismiss the lawsuit because the Communications Decency Act, a 1996 law protecting free speech on the internet, shielded Backpage from liability for the content of the ads. Tech companies commonly invoke the Communications Decency Act in defending against similar lawsuits.

Throughout, the primary questions vexing both the legal community and computer services industry have been: Where should courts place the fulcrum between "interactive computer service" providers and "information content provider," such that congressional intent and policy objectives regarding Section-230 immunity are upheld? That is, what kinds of actions and uses of online communication tools on the part of an ISP should amount to partial “creation or development” of content by an "information content provider"?

The problem described above (and as illustrated by the lawsuit against Backpage) is complex and multifaceted. In the most basic terms: § 230’s statutory definitions--upon which immunity turns--are composed of ambiguous and overlapping terms, and increasingly diverse and interactive online service providers do not neatly map onto those categories. Consequently, CDA-jurisprudence has long suffered from inconsistency, court holdings often at odds with the policy objectives originally enshrined in the Act.

It appears, then, that the givens are resoundingly clear. There is a great need for the Supreme Court to supply lower courts with a unifying standard that follows Congress’s calculus of competing interests--that is, offering wide-ranging protection for innovation and self-regulation among online service providers, while enabling victims’ access to means of effective recourse when circumstances warrant treating an ISP as a traditional publisher. When the right case comes along, the Supreme Court should grant cert and clarify the conflict of law currently taking place at the circuit level.*

 

*Recall that the Ninth Circuit markedly deviated from traditional CDA-interpretation by fashioning the "material contribution" standard for liability in Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC. 

Canadian Commission Says All Residents Entitled to Broadband

In a much-anticipated decision released Wednesday, the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission declared that all residents are entitled to access voice and broadband Internet services on fixed and mobile wireless networks.

The ruling compels telecommunications providers to help fund $750-million in broadband infrastructure in rural and remote areas over the next five years, sets ambitious speed targets and requires them to offer an unlimited data plan.

The European Commission's Article 29 Working Party has issued draft guidelines on implementing the GDPR

The Article 29 Working Party has issued draft guidelines to be adopted next month for review and comments: 

The Guidelines on the Data Right to Portability, in particular, helpfully expands on an individual's "right to receive personal data processed by a data controller." This is supposed to help data subjects manage and reuse such personal data themselves.

*A stray observation: In stark contrast to the EU, such a right is not recognized in the U.S. outside of the patient-health data and financial-information contexts. Here, data that is seamlessly collected by online services and IoT products (e.g., "wearables" such as FitBits) is widely considered to be proprietary. Generally, service providers are under no obligation to disclose to customers personal data that has been collected about them. The difference in approach between the U.S. and the EU, in large part, stems from each's views on individual privacy as a legal right. The U.S., for example, adheres to the Third Party Doctrine, which heavily influences what a person's reasonable expectations of privacy are considered to be. Put differently, data shared with service providers is not considered "private." Conversely, a data subject's "right to receive personal data processed by a data controller," as enshrined by the GDPR, further adds to the sharp juxtaposition between the two jurisdictions. 

Freedom of expression includes the freedom to link

The European Court of Human Rights is currently reviewing Magyar Jeti Zrt v. Hungary, a case in which a Hungarian court found a news website liable for posting a hyperlink after that site was sued by a political party . . . The Hungarian Kúria’s decision also has troubling implications for freedom of expression, a core Wikimedia value. Links aren’t just a way of of connecting and building upon information, they are also part of the linkers’ rights to express themselves, to hear others, and to discuss issues that matter to them. Limiting their use would inevitably sweep up a great deal of such expression. This is especially problematic where the government’s rules would silence journalists who are reporting on important issues of the day. Their ability to provide information to the public would be damaged.